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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to estimate the energy 
savings and greenhouse gas emission reductions from 
energy rating and disclosure policies in New York City. 
During the first six year of the policy, the City saw a 
cumulative energy savings of 10.8% and cumulative 
GHG reductions of 8.5%. However, these gross changes 
cannot necessarily be attributed to the benchmarking 
and transparency policies. In order to estimate the 
“counterfactual” scenario – what would have happened 
if the policy was not implemented, we use a combination 
of Difference-in-Difference Estimation and Propensity 
Score Matching. Based on this model, we conclude that 
the disclosure of Energy Star Scores to the public did 
not have a significant effect on energy savings and GHG 
emissions reductions for multifamily buildings.
Palabras-claves: Energy; benchmarking; disclosure; 
causal inference.
Estimación de ahorros de energía y reducciones de 
emisiones de gases de efecto invernadero a partir de 
políticas de calificación y divulgación de energía
RESUMEN
El propósito de este documento es estimar el ahorro 
de energía y las reducciones de emisiones de gases 
de efecto invernadero de las políticas de calificación 
y divulgación de energía en la ciudad de Nueva York. 
Durante los primeros seis años de la política, la Ciudad 
registró un ahorro de energía acumulada del 10.8% 
y reducciones acumuladas de GHG del 8.5%. Sin 
embargo, estos grandes cambios no necesariamente 
se pueden atribuir a las políticas de evaluación 
comparativa y transparencia. Para estimar el escenario 
"contrafactual", ¿qué hubiera pasado si la política no se 
hubiera implementado?, se utiliza el método de dobles 
diferencias emparejadas. Con base en este modelo, 
concluimos que la divulgación de Energy Star Scores al 
público no tuvo un efecto significativo en el ahorro de 
energía y las reducciones de emisiones de GEI para 
edificios multifamiliares.
Keywords: Energía; evaluación comparativa; 
divulgación; inferencia causal.
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, local legislators have begun passing ener-
gy benchmarking and disclosure laws in big cities across Ame-
rica. These policies, aimed at increasing buildings’ energy effi-
ciency, are part of the larger “going green” and “sustainability” 
movements. In 2009, for example, New York City (NYC) passed 
their first benchmarking and disclosure law - Local Law 84. The 
Appendix shows the evolution of NYC benchmarking and trans-
parency policy.
The theory of change behind these laws is two-fold. First, bench-
marking policies force building owners to actually track, analyze, 
and compare their energy use and costs. This ensures that 
every building owner actually pays attention to their energy con-
sumption and can help them identify their largest inefficiencies. 
Secondly, these laws also require buildings to report their ener-
gy use for inclusion in a public database. The public database 
allows owners to compare their buildings’ energy use to that of 
similar buildings and see how they stack up. Additionally, poten-
tial renters, buyers, and investors are able to view a building’s 
energy efficiency and can use that information when assessing 
investment opportunities. Lawmakers theorize that by tying the 
building’s market value to its energy efficiency, owners will be 
more incentivized to increase efficiency (Palmer, Walls, Gordon 
& Gerarden, 2013; Stavins, 2003; Winston, 2008).
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has reported that 
these policies have decreased energy consumption by 7% over 
a three-year period. However, their study failed to prove actual 
causality between the policy and the decrease. To date, various 
other studies have also shown conflicting results as to the effec-
tiveness of benchmarking policies (Meng, Hsu & Han, 2017). Ne-
vertheless, in 2016, New York City expanded their benchmarking 
and disclosure requirement to include buildings over 25,000 feet 
with Local Law 133. Additionally, in 2017, New York City appro-
ved a bill requiring large buildings to post their energy efficiency 
scores, and associated grades, near their public entrances. This 
is intended to make information about a building’s energy use 
easily available to tenants and visitors, including prospective pur-
chasers or lessees, and presented in the easily understood form 
of a grade.
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Before the city continues to use resources to expand 
this policy further, it is critical to perform an evaluation 
of it (Delmas Montes-Sancho & Shimshack, 2010; 
Hsu, 2014; Granade, Creyts, Derkach, Farese, Ny-
quist & Ostrowski, 2009). Since new data has been 
reported as a result of the 2016 law, it is an oppor-
tune time to analyze if energy benchmarking and 
disclosure laws actually cause a decrease in energy 
consumption and GHG emissions. Proof of the po-
licy’s utility will be beneficial to advocate for greater 
expansion in New York City as well as push for re-
form in other cities considering these policies. On the 
other hand, evidence that these policies are ineffec-
tive can be used as cautionary tales for other cities 
before they waste resources pushing these policies.
Furthermore, since the New York City benchmar-
king and disclosure policy has multiple elements 
(disclosure, benchmarking, scoring), it is important 
to assess which aspects are the main causal chan-
ge mechanisms. By understanding which particular 
features of the policy are most effective, New York 
City can better tailor it and more effectively allocate 
resources to promote the most significant change. 
Therefore, this research will investigate the overall 
gross impacts of the benchmarking and disclosure 
policy as well as the causal effectiveness of one as-
pect of the policy - Energy Star Scores - on changes 
in energy consumption and GHG emissions.
2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Figure 1 provides a description of how the NYC 
Benchmarking and Disclosure Policy is supposed 
to deliver the desired results. In general, immedia-
te and short-term outcomes focus on the earliest 
effects of awareness and the initial actions taken 
towards saving energy. Intermediate outcomes are 
the intended changes to market structure or market 
actor behavior, such as owners making building im-
provements to secure deeper energy savings and 
property values incorporating energy performan-
ce. Long-term outcomes are the intended market 
effects expressed in the persistent energy savings 
and greenhouse gas reductions (US Department of 
Energy, 2015).
In order to achieve these objectives, many forms of 
information disclosure are taken place, such as: 
Reports: The New York Mayor’s Office of Sustaina-
bility releases on its website annual reports, explai-
ning in details the updated program and its results.
Databases in NYC Open Data: In the public data-
base NYC Open Data, there are data of NYC mu-
nicipal and private buildings for the calendar years 
2011-2016.
Energy Star Score: This is a 1-to-100 percentile 
ranking, calculated in Portfolio Manager, based on 
Figure 1. Theory of Change
Source: Prepared by the author, based on Benchmarking Reports (Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning & Sustainability, 2012, 
2013, 2014; Urban Green Council, 2016, 2017), and Benchmarking and Transparency Policy Report – Impact Evaluation Report 
(U.S. Department of Energy, 2015).
55Ind. data 21(2), 2018
Producción y Gestión
Fátima Uriarte
self-reported energy usage for the reporting year. A 
higher score indicates better performance.
User friendly websites: Some websites or platforms 
are available for the public to check the data using 
visualization tools. For example: “Energy Star Port-
folio Manager”, and “Metered New York”.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data
Our primary sources are the databases available 
in NYC Open Data that cover the period 2011 to 
2016. We use weather normalized source energy 
use intensity (EUI) and total GHG emissions as 
dependent variables. The Mayor’s Office of Long-
Term Planning & Sustainability (2017) defines the 
weather normalized source EUI as the “energy use 
intensity as calculated by the source of energy ge-
neration in kBtus per gross square foot (kBtu/ft2) for 
the reporting year, normalized for weather” (p.3), 
and GHG emissions as “the total direct and indirect 
greenhouse gases emitted by the property, repor-
ted in metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt-
CO2e) for the reporting year” (p.3).
Additionally, we use Energy Star Scores if they 
apply, and other building characteristics available in 
the City of New York's Primary Land Use Tax Lot 
Output (PLUTO) dataset. 
Before estimating the energy impact of NYC bench-
marking and transparency policies, we do a series 
of data cleaning steps following the methodology 
developed by the US Department of Energy (2015), 
such as: (i) removed all duplicate entries, (ii) remo-
ved all buildings that were not available in PLUTO 
dataset, (iii) removed all building with building types 
that were zero or blank, (iv) removed all buildings 
with site EUIs outside of a reasonable range (5-
1,000 kBtu/ft2), and (v) removed all buildings with 
abnormal changes in site EUIs between two years 
being compared 2.
3.2. Research Design
According to the US Department of Energy (2015), 
benchmarking and transparency policies have the 
following impacts:
• Gross Impacts: The change in buildings’ 
energy usage over time inclusive of actions 
taken to reduce energy consumption, as well 
as their participation in other energy efficiency 
activities or programs.
• Net Impacts: The subset of measured 
gross energy changes attributable to the 
Benchmarking and Transparency policy. That 
is, the net savings after taking into account 
natural market forces and the impacts from 
other local, state, federal, and utility energy-
efficiency program and tax credit initiatives.
The gross impacts are calculated by comparing 
the same population of buildings over the years. 
However, this evaluation cannot necessarily attribu-
te these energy savings to the benchmarking and 
transparency policies. In theory, the actual energy 
savings achieved by a benchmarking and trans-
parency policy should be equal to the difference 
between the amount of energy used by buildings 
subject to the policy and the amount of energy they 
would have used had the policy not been adopted. 
This baseline is called the “counterfactual” scenario 
– what would have happened if the policy was not 
implemented. As the counterfactual scenario does 
not exist and cannot be directly measured, defining 
an approach that approximates it is the fundamental 
challenge to estimating energy impacts and docu-
menting the benefits of policies (US Department of 
Energy, 2015). As such, we are only able to isolate 
the effects of Energy Star Scores on consumption 
behavior. Net impacts for Energy Star Scores will be 
calculated using a combination of propensity score 
matching and difference and difference techniques. 
Propensity Score Matching
The standard theoretical framework for analyzing 
the problem of impact evaluation is based on the 
potential outcome model or Roy-Rubin model (Ber-
nal & Peña, 2012). Formally, we define the treat-
ment indicator as 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 , with 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 if the individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  receives the treament and zero otherwise. The 
outcome variables are defined as 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)  for each 
individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 …𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁  and 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 denotes the total po-
pulation. That is, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1)  is the outcome variable if 
the individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is treated and 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0)  is the outcome 
variable if the individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  is not treated. The effect 
of the treatment, or impact of an event on a variable 
of interest, for an individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  can be written as:
𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0) 
 
 The fundamental problem of impact evaluation is 
that in reality only one of the two potential results 
2 Specifically, buildings that had site EUIs that increased or decreased more 
than 50% were removed because changes beyond these thresholds were 
likely due to reasons other than the policy (change in occupancy, erroneous 
data entry, change in space usage, etc.)
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Yi(1) or Yi(0) is given for each individual 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , but ne-
ver both, so the expected result can be written as: 
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1) + (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖)𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0) = { 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜  𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0) 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0  
 
Because one of the results in the above equation 
is not observable for the same individual, it is not 
possible to estimate the individual effect of the treat-
ment Ti . Therefore, the analysis should focus on the 
average impact of treatment on the population or 
subsets of the population. In the present study, we 
want to estimate the average treatment effects on 
the treated (ATT); that is, the average effect of NYC 
benchmarking and transparency policies on ener-
gy consumptions and GHG emissions of the subset 
of buildings that actually disclosure its Energy Star 
Score, which corresponds to the difference between 
the average of the energy consumption (and GHG 
emissions) in the group of buildings subject to Ener-
gy Star policy and the average of the energy con-
sumption (and GHG emissions) that these buildings 
would have used if the policy was not implemented.
𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(1)/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1] − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖(0)/𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1] 
 
Where E[./D] denotes the operator of conditional 
expectations.
In this case E[Yi(1)/Di=1] is the expected value of 
the outcome variable in the treatment group in the 
presence of the treatment and E[Yi(0)/Di=1], which 
is known as counterfactual, is the expected value of 
the outcome variable in the treatment group in the 
absence of treatment. Obviously, this is a hypothe-
tical result, so it is not observed and therefore is not 
recorded in the data.
One way of estimating the counterfactual is to assu-
me that, given a set of observable variables X  that 
are not determined by the treatment, the potential 
results, Yi(0) and Yi(1), are independent of the treat-
ment allocation. This assumption implies that all the 
variables that simultaneously affect the allocation to 
the treatment and the potential results (Yi) are ob-
served by the researcher and included in the model 
that is estimated. This estimation method is known 
in the impact assessment literature as matching.
Suppose we want to estimate the impact of the in-
tervention by comparing the outcome variables of 
the treatment and control group:E[Yi(1)/Di=1] – E[Yi(0)/Di=0]
Adding and subtracting the counterfactual, E[Yi(0)/Di=1] , we have:
=E[Yi(1)/Di=1] – E[Yi(0)/Di=1] + E[Yi(0)/Di=1] – E[Yi(0)/Di=0]
The first two terms are the average treatment effects 
on the treated (TATT). The last two measure the se-
lection bias: the difference between the counterfac-
tual and the outcome variable for the control group.
One possibility is to assume that the selection bias 
is due only to differences in the observable charac-
teristics, so that:Y(0), Y(1)┴ D/X,        ⱯX
What is called the conditional independence (CI) 
assumption. This assumption ensures that by con-
ditioning in the observable variables X,  E[Yi(0)/Di=1, X] = E[Yi(0)/Di=0, X]  and, therefore, that the 
selection bias is equal to zero. Thus, calculating the 
impact of the event of interest as the difference in 
the average of the outcome variables of the treat-
ment and control group, conditioned on the obser-
ved variables, generates an unbiased estimate of 
the true effect of the treatment.
Note that the implementation of the estimator can 
be computationally complex if there is a large num-
ber of variables based on which we are matching, 
that is, if the vector X has a very large dimension. 
One possibility is to match individuals based on 
their estimated propensity score, given their obser-
vable characteristics P(X), where:P(X) = P(D=1|X)
That is, each individual of the treatment group will 
be matched with that of the control group with a 
propensity score in the program sufficiently close. 
All pairing estimators contrast the result variable of 
a treated individual with the results of one or more 
members of the control group that most closely re-
semble the individual treated, based on the measu-
re P(X).
The common support condition (CS) implies that 
only individuals from the control group that have 
propensity scores P(X) similar to the propensity sco-
res of the treatment group are used in the estima-
tion, which is known as propensity score matching 
(PSM). For example, if there are individuals from 
the control group with very low propensity score, but 
no treated individual exhibits such a low propensity 
score, then these individuals from the control group 
will be discarded when making the pairing.
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Assuming that the conditions of CI and CS are met, 
the ATT estimator by PSM would be given by:
𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷=1{𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(1)|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)] − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌(0)|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)]} 
 
Where EP(X)|D=1 is the expected value with respect 
to the propensity score P(X), conditional on being a 
participant of the program.
The result of the pairing method is reliable as long 
as there are reasons to believe that variables not 
observable or not available in the database are not 
a fundamental determinant of potential results.
Difference-in-Difference Matching
One of the advantages of the matching method is 
that it can be applied to a single information sur-
vey, as long as there are observations of treatments 
and controls. However, if there is longitudinal infor-
mation, or repeated cross sections, the matching 
method can be combined with the difference-in-di-
fferences (DiD) method, in such a way that the as-
sumptions of each of these methods are relaxed, 
and therefore, the results become more robust. 
Thus, through the combination of matching and DiD 
we have eliminated the time constant unobserved 
effects.
By having longitudinal information and combining 
the PSM with differences in differences, the selec-
tion to treatment may also depend on unobserva-
ble variables, as long as they remain constant over 
time. If information is available for two periods, t =1 
is the period before the implementation of the treat-
ment and t =2 is the period after the implementation 
of the treatment or follow-up period. The condition 
of conditional independence in this context is re-
defined as the assumption that the evolution of the 
non-observables is independent of the treatment, 
when controlling for:ui2 – u i1┴ D/X, ⱯX
The subscript of u indicates the period to which that 
observation corresponds. For example, u i1 corres-
ponds to the observation u in the period prior to 
the implementation of the treatment. This version 
of conditional independence implies that the treat-
ments and controls would have evolved in the same 
way if neither of them had been the object of the 
treatment. That is, the objective variable for both 
groups follows a common trend.
Since we are combining the matching method with 
the difference-in-difference method, we need to res-
trict common support to ensure that the treatment 
and control groups are very similar and thus identify 
the ATT appropriately.
Assuming that the conditions of CI and CS are met, 
the ATT estimator of difference-in-difference mat-
ching (DDM), in the common support region, would 
be given by:
𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷=1{𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2(1) − 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌1(1)|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 1,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)] − 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸[𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌2(0) − 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌1(0)|𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 0,𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋)]} 
 
Where EP(X)|D=1 is the expected value with respect to 
the propensity score, conditional on being a parti-
cipant of the program. The subscript of Y indicates 
the period to which that observation of the result va-
riable corresponds. For example, Y1 corresponds to 
the observation of Y in the period before treatment. 
Finally, the condition .|D indicates whether the ob-
servation corresponds to an individual in the treat-
ment group (D = 1) or to an individual in the control 
group (D = 0).
4. RESULTS
4.1. Gross Impacts
First, gross energy impacts were calculated by com-
paring the same set of 582 buildings that reported 
their total EUI every year from 2011 to 2016. Overall 
energy savings were calculated by comparing the 
difference in total EUIs (Energy Use Intensity/Squa-
re foot) between 2011 and each subsequent year. 
Results indicate that total EUIs were reduced each 
year with a cumulative reduction of 10.8% from 
2011 to 2016 (Figure 2). This equates to an average 
savings of 3,600 MMBtus per building.
However, Figure 3 shows that these results varied 
significantly when evaluating by building type. Mul-
tifamily housing, for example, saw an increase in 
consumption of 4.82% over the years while Offices 
and Hotels saw a decrease.
Similar to energy savings, gross GHG impacts were 
calculated by taking the difference in the total GHG 
emissions between each year from the same group 
of 318 buildings that reported annually. While we 
see a cumulative decline of 8.5% in GHG emissions 
from 2011 to 2016, there was not a monotonic de-
crease throughout the years (Figure 4). There was 
a 20.9% drop between 2011 and 2012 but then total 
GHG emissions fluctuate between increasing and 
decreasing until 2016. Looking at just 2011 and 
2016, there was a difference of 15,806 MtCO2e 
which equates to a reduction of 50 MtCO2e per 
building. It is worth mentioning that there was not 
sufficient data to analyze by building type.
58
Producción y Gestión
Ind. data 21(2), 2018
Estimating EnErgy savings and grEEnhousE gas Emission rEductions from EnErgy rating and disclosurE policiEs
While we see reductions in both Energy use and 
GHG emissions over the 6-year time-period, net im-
pacts need to be calculated to determine if these 
reductions can be attributed to the Benchmarking 
and Disclosure policy.
4.2. Net Impacts: Difference-in-Difference 
Matching
This section investigates the effect of disclosing 
the Energy Star Score. It is worth mentioning that 
the variable to be estimated is the difference in the 
 
Figure 2. Gross Energy Savings
Source: Prepared by the author, based on the Energy and Water Data Disclosure Dataset.
 
Figure 3. Energy Consumption by Building Type
Source: Prepared by the author, based on the Energy and Water Data Disclosure Dataset.
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weather normalized source energy use intensity 
and GHG emissions, before and after the Energy 
Star disclosure. Thus, each difference in those va-
riables in the treatment group will be paired with a 
set of controls, according to the nearest neighbor 
matching 3.
In this exercise we use multifamily housing buil-
dings that have information before and after the im-
plementation of the policy. We chose to use only 
multifamily buildings over other types of buildings 
such as offices or hotels because there may be fac-
tors that make energy consumption in the residen-
tial sector different from energy consumption in the 
commercial or industrial sector. Additionally, multi-
family buildings represent 74% of total buildings in 
NYC in 2016.
To estimate the effect of Energy Star Scores using 
DiD matching, we first estimate the propensity sco-
re. Since this variable is binary, it can be estimated 
using logit or probit models. Most of the variables 
included are highly significant and the model is sig-
nificant as a whole. With the estimated coefficients, 
the propensity score is predicted for both the treat-
ment and control groups. It is worth mentioning that 
the common support region in this application is 
approximate 5,000 buildings 4. 
Table 1 shows the impact of disclosing Energy Star 
Scores on the variables of interest estimated by 
DiD matching. The disclosure of Energy Star Sco-
res to the public decreased the source EUI by 0.58 
percentage points. Additionally, it seems to be an 
increased in GHG emissions of 0.35 percentage 
4 In order to test the robustness of the method, the space of the estimated 
probabilities of the treatment and control groups was divided into blocks of 
propensity scores. The strata were chosen with the objective of balancing the 
propensity scores among them, that is, the average propensity score of the 
treatment and control groups was equal. In this way, an optimal number of 
ten blocks was determined and it was proved, block by block, that there were 
no statistically significant differences between buildings of the treatment and 
control group.
 
Figure 4. Gross GHG Emissions Savings
Source: Prepared by the author, based on the Energy and Water Data Disclosure Dataset.
Table 1. Effects of Disclosing Energy Star Scores (percentage points)
Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat
WNSourceE UI 3.26 3.83 -0.58 1.93 -0.3
GHG Emissions 1.86 1.52 0.35 2.61 0.13
Source: Prepared by the author, based on the Energy and Water Data Disclosure Dataset and the City of New 
York's Primary Land Use Tax Lot Output (PLUTO).
3 The PSM estimator for nearest neighbor consists of taking each individual 
from the treatment group and looking for an individual in the control group 
with the closest propensity score, that is, the nearest neighbor based on P(X). 
That is, the individual in the control group such that the distance between 
their predicted propensity score of the individual in the treatment group is 
minimal.
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points. However, these impacts are not statistically 
significant. From the results obtained, it seems that 
the Energy Star Scores have not attracted the at-
tention of market actors to energy use.
Limitations
The main conclusion of this paper relies on the DiD 
Matching model. However, as was stated earlier in 
the document, we assume that selection to treat-
ment not only depends on observable variables, 
but also on unobservable variables, as long as they 
remain constant over time. There may be the case 
that some unobservable variable change over time, 
affecting our results. Also, this analysis is based 
only on three years of data because Energy Star 
Scores for multifamily buildings were available sin-
ce 2014, so our results may indicate that actors and 
the market require some time to incorporate such 
energy ranking information.
Our result is different from the one obtained by 
Meng et al. (2017). After applying a novel differen-
ce-in-difference strategy, they conclude that in the 
fourth year of policy implementation, the disclosu-
re of Energy Star Scores to the public decreased 
the source EUI by 12.9%, when controlling for other 
key building features. However, they analyzed the 
energy consumption of private office buildings using 
public buildings as controls, while we analyzed mul-
tifamily buildings.
5. CONCLUSION
The gross energy savings increased steadily be-
tween 2010 and 2016 while reductions in GHG 
emissions fluctuated over the years but saw an ove-
rall decrease when comparing 2011 to 2016. Howe-
ver, the actual energy savings achieved by a bench-
marking and transparency policy should be equal to 
the difference between the amount of energy used 
by buildings subject to the policy and the amount 
of energy they would have used had the policy not 
been adopted. In order to estimate the “counterfac-
tual” scenario – what would have happened if the 
policy was not implemented, we use a combination 
of Difference-in-Difference Estimation and Propen-
sity Score Matching.
Our quasi-experimental evaluation determined that 
we cannot necessarily attribute these energy sa-
vings to the benchmarking and transparency poli-
cies. That is, the net savings after taking into ac-
count natural market forces and the impacts from 
other local, state, federal, and utility energy-efficien-
cy program and tax credit initiatives is not statisti-
cally significant. Therefore, we conclude that the 
disclosure of Energy Star Scores to the public did 
not have a significant effect on energy savings and 
GHG emissions reductions for multifamily buildings 
in the first years of policy implementation.
It seems that the Energy Star Scores have not at-
tracted the attention of market actors to energy use. 
Although Local Law 84 requires that property owners 
report energy performance data to the City, which 
then publishes the data online, it does not require 
property owners to ensure that tenants are at any 
point presented with the information collected. We 
suggest to make the information about energy use 
easily available to tenants. There is evidence that 
benchmarking and transparency policies work in 
Latin America, but these countries have focus their 
policies in providing information to the individuals 
that are the ones who actually consume the service 
(Scartascini, 2017). The information is provided in 
their bills using behavioral economic insights 5.
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APPENDIX
Evolution of NYC Benchmarking and Transparency Policy
 
Source: Prepared by the author, based on Benchmarking Reports (Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning & Sustainability, 2012, 2013, 
2014; Urban Green Council, 2016, 2017)
